Moldova fears more power outages in the coming days, such as the ones it has suffered twice, in October and November, as a result of Russian bombardments on the Ukrainian energy infrastructure. When this happens, the high voltage line that comes from Romania is disconnected for safety. This line starts from Isaccea and runs through the south of Ukraine to Cuciurgan, in the republic Transnistrian secessionist – the post-Soviet conflict frozen since 1992 – to enter Moldovan territory.
Cuciurgan – on the banks of the Dniester River, which separates Moldova from Transnistria – is also where the thermal power plant is located, which has always been the largest supplier of electricity in Moldova, 70% of it, the rest coming from Ukraine and production own. Cuciurgán is fed by Russian gas that arrives from the Ukraine; the same gas that feeds (100%) also the Moldovans and that until a few days ago they feared to stop receiving. The Russian threat was ultimately not carried out, as confirmed on Monday by the Russian consortium Gazprom, which also owns 50% of the state gas company, Moldovagaz.
Ukraine has stopped selling electricity to Moldova, whose line with Romania is disconnected due to bombing
The Moldovan electrical connection
Territories annexed or recognized by Russia
Source: Moldelectrica and own elaboration. THE VANGUARD
The Moldovan electrical connection
Territories annexed or recognized by Russia
Source: Moldelectrica and own elaboration. THE VANGUARD
The Moldovan electrical connection
Territories annexed or recognized by Russia
Source: Moldelectrica and own elaboration. THE VANGUARD
Russia has practiced gas war with Moldova for years, intermittently whenever Moldova’s policy turned towards Europe. In the last chapter (the previous one was a year ago), he has accused the Chisinau government of not paying for the reserves it stores in Ukraine and has accused Ukraine of keeping part of that supply. The debt with Gazprom is 80% of Moldovan GDP.
Claiming that they did not receive enough gas, the Transnistrians have been reducing the electricity supply to Moldova to less than 30%. Although Russia maintains some 1,200 soldiers and a considerable – although obsolete – arsenal in that territory since the war that divided the country between pro-Romanians and pro-Russians in 1992, Moscow is far away, and Transnistria needs to maintain the exchange of energy with Moldova for export licenses (Moldovans) of their products to the European market, so it is not believed that their leaders will ever turn off the energy tap.
The impact of the Ukrainian war on Moldova (and once the possibility for the Russian army to conquer Odesa and reach Transnistria has been ruled out) has also come from another side. Last March, just after the Russian invasion began, Ukraine and Moldova disconnected from the network post soviet and they were synchronized with the European one, something that was planned to be done in 2023. But the connection to the European grid has not been of much use to Ukraine, nor to Moldova, which in October stopped receiving supply (30% of their needs) due to the impact of Russian bombing.
The situation would be different if instead of depending on the existing Romanian line, Isaccea-Cuciurgán, progress had been made in the direct line from Isaccea to Chisinau, a project sponsored by the World Bank. Another project from Romania, through the north of Moldova, has not even started.
Now, Moldova is buying the electricity that comes through Romania on the European market, while the neighboring country (and brother, in historical terms) subsidizes a part. The EU has gotten down to work and is covering between 80%-90% of electricity needs. But for the population, conditions continue to be dramatic.
Twenty years ago, when Unión Fenosa was the supplier for the country (it bought the supply in Transnistria), it began to install meters in houses. Accustomed to the Soviet system, nobody wanted them. Today, electricity and gas bills account for 70% of household spending, in a context of inflation of 35%. Polls indicate that Moldovans’ pro-European bias has increased with the war in Ukraine, but this winter presents a challenge for the government of the young president Maia Sandu. A pro-Russian minority – which supports the party of a corrupt oligarch who fled the country, Ilan Shor – presses every day with protests against this unbearable situation, and the recent history of Europe’s poorest country shows how sensitive it is to fluctuations.
